Of Greek Tragedy
For most British people, Greece is a warm, happy, carefree place. Those who have already been there grin upon encountering its name. They reminisce over their post-A-level holidays: the sun, the sea, the beach parties, the bars/clubs and round-the-clock access to cheap underage alcohol. Some might have even noticed the charming Mediterranean setting - the architecture, the cuisine, the people, the culture - all of secondary importance to their wild nightlife, naturally. Their Greece was Malia, Corfu, Zante and other budget summer destinations in the Greek islands.
A few hours away on the ferryboat lies Athens, Greece’s ancient capital. Self-proclaimed lovers of Greek culture gently smile at its thought. They cannot forget their cultured excursions in the picturesque neighbourhoods of Athens’ centre: the landmarks standing the test of time, the simple beauty of meze, souvlaki and seafood, the haggling at Monastiraki’s flea market, the daunting magnificence of the Parthenon. However, what lay beyond this tourist-entrapping façade evaded them altogether.
For most Athenians, the cement-ridden reality of their hometown is not so bright. Home to an estimated four million people - more than a third of the country’s population - Athens is the most densely populated city in the developed world. In many respects, it is a city like every other. There is traffic and pollution, injustice and crime, poverty and inequality. In its asphyxiating urban environment people struggle daily, most of them without much success, to make ends meet. But Athens is not just like every other city.
The events of the past year are testament to this statement. On December 6, 2008 police officer Epaminondas Korkoneas fatally shot a fifteen-year-old, Alexis Grigoropoulos in the Exarcheia district of central Athens. Korkoneas reported that the victim was part of a group of teenagers that confronted him verbally, and that he fired three warning shots in the air, in order to disperse them. The bullet that hit Alexis was, allegedly, a ricochet. Eyewitness testimonies explicitly contradicted him and their authenticity was later confirmed by forensic tests. It has hence been established that the officer shot Alexis directly, defying orders from police headquarters to disengage. He was thereby publicly condemned and imprisoned on charges of intentional homicide.
On the other hand, Alexis - Athens’ own Rodney King - was martyrised despite his apolitical nature and to this day his death is far from forgotten. Nevertheless, tragic as his story of police brutality was, the events that followed overshadowed it. Alexis’ death served as a spark for underlying social strife, immediately setting off an explosion of unrest.
Within an hour erupted the largest turbulence in Greek history since the end of the military dictatorship in 1974. Riots, occupations, sit-ins, rallies and demonstrations occurred in every major Greek city for roughly a month and on an everyday basis. Daily routine, along with Christmas holidays, came to a nearly complete halt. Stores and government buildings were severely damaged, almost destroyed or burnt to the ground. Literally hundreds of cars were torched. More than 15,000 rounds of tear gas were fired and 330 people were arrested. 124 members of riot police were injured. The total monetary cost of these damages was an estimated 2 billion euros, the social and political cost even greater.
At the same time, groups/organisations/movements from all around the globe ensured that tension in Greece did not go unnoticed, by organising hundreds of demonstrations and sit-ins in their respective countries. As a result of these efforts, attention was eventually drawn to the general predicament of Greece’s youth. Why was their response to a proportionately minor event so timely, prolonged and vehement?
Interpretations vary greatly across political perspectives. On the nationalist Right (LAOS Party), illegal immigrants were accused of fuelling the destruction and looting of hard-working Greeks’ property. On the centre-Right (New Democracy Party, ND), supporters of the incumbent government at the time blamed the lax educational policies of previous governments (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party, PASOK) for student discontent. Similarly PASOK supporters, located on the centre-Left, blamed the ND government for its failed educational reforms. Finally, the far Left (Communist Party) urged an interpretation of events based on class struggle, viewing the riots as a popular uprising of the oppressed masses. Unfortunately, the major parties were absorbed by blame-passing and catering to their established voters’ preferences.
Although one could see why each party was voicing its respective position, it was clear that neither of them could grasp why Greek youth were rebelling. LAOS’ position was an intentional misunderstanding of the role of immigrants in the uprisings. It was undeniable that the looters were mainly non-Greeks, but it was also undeniable that looters were the poorest amongst those rioting, those most in need of valuables they could exchange for money. It was the socio-economic profile of the looters one should focus on, not the racial.
ND’s position was simply a defence of its interests against its main competitor, PASOK. It was easy to blame the latter’s past educational policies, which strengthened the state-centred approach to education, due to the educational system’s current failures. After all, ND had not been in power for 12 years. But did the products of a failing education system warrant such a reaction? Furthermore, could that have been the rationale of those who were not in higher education for participating in the events?
PASOK, much like its competitor charged ND for its attempts to introduce private universities, an act previously prohibited by the Greek Constitution. This was greeted with much opposition from both students and academia, but legislation was still passed and the wave of reaction to it had withered away by December 2008. It seems, therefore, a bit presumptuous to assume that recent reforms could have fuelled such deep-rooted discontent.
Lastly, the Communist Party was trying to fit facts into pre-determined interpretations, as opposed to formulating new ones to accommodate events. Despite the presence of a majority of underprivileged young people in the protests - most of them unsympathetic to the ruling elite -there was no unifying vision or guiding ideology in their actions. A revolution requires a planned set of arrangements (economic, political, social, cultural) for the future. The participants in this ‘uprising’ were aware of their predicament and, to an extent, its roots, but by no means had they located its remedy. In this sense, the Communists were, once again, advancing traditional Marxist rhetoric of class warfare, not searching for a ‘way out’ for the young.
Outside the politics of blame passing, and catering to a loyal body of voters, stood only one party. The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), a minor party with only half a dozen seats in Parliament, was viewed as the only hope for Greece’s youth. Its popularity had risen exponentially in the months preceding the December events, and was further boosted in their light. This was viewed with much hostility by the major parties, which proceeded to undermine its public image by waging allegations against its leader, A. Tsipras. The latter had tried to justify the rioters’ actions and cultivate unity amongst them. With the assistance of the mass media this was immediately turned against him, which portrayed him as an anarchist and an extremist, driving the country to chaos. Within the course of the next few months, SYRIZA’s appeal had dropped to a fifth of its peak. The issues it raised, though, did not disappear.
SYRIZA resonated with the rioters because it managed to see the hopelessness that Greece has entrapped its youth in. This was reflected in the way they were rebelling; there was no Hollywood ending in sight, just a burning desire to escape the present’s Panopticon. Reactionaries were quick to downplay their concerns. However economic figures are, as always, undeniable and the picture that they paint is grim one.
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) unemployment amongst people aged 15 to 24 was 22 per cent at the time, with some estimates placing it around 30 per cent, making it the highest in Europe. As a result, a quarter of young Greek people live below the poverty line, a trend that has been increasing over time and will most likely continued to do so due to the economic crisis. Data like this makes it clear why Greek youth could only foresee a dark future. Repeated historical experience from past governments had taught them an ugly lesson: do not expect things to change. At this point, one inevitably asks oneself, “What lies ahead”?
If the future, as they say, lies in a country’s youth, then Greece’s prospects are bleak. Disestablishmentarianism, the English language’s longest word, finds its shortest fuse in Greece’s young generation. Unfortunately, few can say that much was achieved by December 2008’s events. Fundamental problems remain intact, solutions as hazy as ever. Many have since accused the young of accelerating the anxieties they wished to alleviate. Maybe so. But as every Greek parent teaches his children “Better try and fail, then live in regrets”.
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